Four “Hot” Deal Structures and Pricing Models in Sourcing of BPO and KPO Services
May 21, 2012 by Bierce & Kenerson, P.C.
CIO Magazine observes that outsourcing service providers are offering innovative pricing models to escape commodity-based pricing pressures: joint ventures, “business outcomes”-based pricing, revenue sharing and dedicated centers of excellence. Here’s an outsourcing lawyer’s analysis of these pricing models. I have only two questions: is it valid, legal, binding and enforceable? Does it cover the most significant risk-reward scenarios?
Classic Pricing Model: Inputs and Outputs. The traditional pricing model has been either an agreed fee per resource used (such as “dollars per full-time equivalent”) or, if demand and scope are stable, per-user per month. These resource-based pricing models start with a “base case” of the customer’s current utilization rates for resources and projects future changes in volume. The provider wants to ensure that demand will exceed a baseline, or that it can exit due to unrealized expectations.
In a resource-based pricing model, the customer wants scalability and predictability based on demand levels. This traditional pricing model has resulted in mismatches of supply and demand, cost overruns due to the vendor’s adding resources to accommodate changed demand or scope, and a focus on input costs, not outputs or business results. Further, this pricing model leaves the customer with little control over management of operations, which achieves the basic goals of delegation of operations but leaves the customer with only the contract to exercise governance and change management.
Innovative Alternatives:
1. Joint Ventures. Any joint venture involves an ongoing relationship for a substantial time. It can take the form of a contract or a new legal entity between the customer and service provider.
Contract Model: Scope, SLA’s, Pricing, Governance. The contract-based model is reflected in the classic outsourcing agreement. The scope of service is defined, and related tasks and responsibilities are allocated, in an exhibit. In early outsourcing contracts, the scope was defined by taking existing processes and re-defining them for sharing between the users and the provider. Currently, it is a well-established best practice to take industry-standard definitions of process workflows (such as by using ITIL or ISO standards for operating a data center, or security management) as the baseline for defining scope. By using industry standards, the parties improve transparency of interactions and workflows, as well as better governance, regulatory compliance and risk management. The classic sourcing agreement also includes service level agreements (SLA’s) as key performance indicators, and pricing discounts for missing the targets. Finally, governance by contract involves establishment of governance bodies, meeting schedules, informal dispute resolution, escalation of issues to “senior” executives and eventual arbitration.
Entity-Type Joint Ventures. The entity-type joint venture offer some advantages over classic sourcing contracts. This assumes the entity’s structure contemplates the predictable relationship life cycle starting with transition and steady-state, then progressing to one of three future outcomes: renegotiation (such as restructuring of scope, SLA’s or pricing), rebid/or and post-termination insourcing. Such advantages arise from the ownership structure: the entity, not the provider, is delivering the services to the corporate customer.
An entity-type joint venture can be structured to look just like a captive shared services “center of excellence.” The JV entity, not the service provider, receives the customer’s proprietary process and the service provider’s personnel. The resulting intellectual property, knowledge management procedures, workforce administration and deliverables are allocated under the entity’s internal corporate documents, such as an LLC operating agreement, and any licenses, services agreements and other transactional documents to define the roles of the parties. This structure fits industry-specific BPO and KPO services, where knowledge management generates the most value to the customer.
Customers may like entity-type joint ventures for two reasons. First, it can control operations by its ownership of equity interests. Ownership can be shared during the term and transferred to either the service provider or the customer upon termination. Second, the JV model has built-in governance models and requires the provider to disclose all cost and process information as co-managers.
- Call Option. Under a “call option,” the customer would have the right to require the service provider to transfer equity ownership to the customer. The customer could convert the entity into a captive by merely taking ownership of all equity. A transfer to the customer might occur if the customer wanted to take control of the people, process rights and internal knowledge base of the joint venture.
- Put Option. Under a “put option,” the customer would have the right to transfer equity ownership to the service provider. This scenario might occur if the customer felt that the entity provided no value to the customer or a new supplier would provide better services, value or “seemless integration.”
- Impact of any Transfer of Ownership. Upon either transfer of ownership rights, there would be a transfer of shares, and no termination of employment or assignment of intellectual property, real estate (or leases) or equipment. The entity has the full bundle of operating rights. However, there could be tax consequences for each party. The lesson of the 2012 Vodaphone decision (of India’s Supreme Court) and the Indian government’s General Anti-Abuse Rules suggests that third-country holding companies would be appropriate. However, intercompany pricing between related parties would invite double taxation in the absence of a double-income tax treaty, and such treaties may limit benefits to local nationals.
Service providers may like this model for other reasons. It can simplify governance management. It is an alternative to insourcing.
In the end, though, joint-venture based arrangements require careful negotiation on:
- allocation of human resources and knowledge management,
- competitive offerings, and
- opportunity costs for the service provider and the economic incentives for the service provider to hire, train and then lose skilled personnel who could be lost not by attrition, but by a call option.
Also, joint ventures run the same legal gauntlet as any business. Bankruptcy is possible. See http://www.outsourcing-law.com/2009/10/case-study-farmland-industries-inc/
2. “Business Outcomes”-Based Pricing. The resource-based pricing model fails to identify opportunities or opportunity cost of the enterprise customer. An “outcomes-based” pricing structure will align the customer’s bottom-line goals with the service provider’s compensation. In employment law, this kind of incentive compensation represents a bonus for achieving benefits for the employer. As such, “incentive-based compensation” can work effectively. However, just as senior executives get paid a base salary, so too would the service provider receive a base compensation relating to the customary “financial base case” starting point for resource-based pricing.
Sophisticated customers familiar with SLA management understand the negative impact of choosing unwisely. If you target one outcome, you will optimize that outcome, potentially at the expense of all others. But if you then add multiple SLA’s and multiple optimized metrics, you create conflicts of priorities, and each priority will have a “pecking order” based on the financial reward structure.
Thus, for the customer a broad business outcome could be used: shareholder value, cash flow, cost of goods sold, return on equity, return on investment, etc.
For the service provider, an outcome-based pricing exposes a raw nerve. The service provider controls its service delivery environment, but not the customer’s core business operations. The outcome-based pricing method forces the provider to become intimately familiar with the customer’s business and commercial environment and provide consulting services (in addition to IT-enabled BPO or KPO) without additional compensation. And the customer might not accept any provider recommendations for achieving the relevant business outcome. Hence, the service provider will adopt such an approach only if it understands the customer’s business gaps (to the extent disclosed or discovered in due diligence) up front, and it sees how its efficiencies can improve upon such gaps. But after the provider “fixes” the customer’s “train wreck” processes, future “outcomes-based” pricing might not be able to achieve such goals.
This approach is just another way to address the problem of “continuous process improvement” vs. “specific short-term improvement projects.”
3. Revenue Sharing. Revenue sharing focuses on defining revenue sources and increasing gross and/or net revenue. This pricing method assumes the parties will be able to increase revenues by contributing to a quasi-joint venture that measures only revenue, not expenses.
Revenue-sharing models resemble traditional “build-own-operate-transfer” models of project finance. An independent private company builds an infrastructure (such as a toll road, port, airport, bridge or other facility), operates it (and collects revenues), then transfers ownership to the local community (e.g., a government). This model encourages BPO and KPO service providers to invest, collect a share of revenue for a while and then, if mutually agreeable, let go of the investment upon expiration.
Revenue sharing models are familiar in other industries, such as the distribution of Hollywood films in the after-market. Success depends on the ability of the service provider to streamline the customer interface, build brand equity and manage collections in a transparent, audited manner.
Customers may like revenue sharing since it requires no payment without an increase in revenue. The customer might be a non-profit membership organization that wishes to license its membership list and organizational meeting archives for a service provider to manage as a service for promotion and member loyalty. What customers must balance, however, is whether the revenue gains are attributable to the service provider or to the customer’s own initiatives.
Service providers may like this model if they understand the customer’s business, the needs of its users and how to sell an improved service.
Pitfalls for both parties abound. The enterprise customer cannot reasonably expect its service provider to depend on revenue growth if the enterprise customer does not perform its own, mutually agreed efforts for revenue growth. This may involve new product development, patenting, branding, marketing, sales support and customer after-sales support. And, most important, the customer needs to announce upfront that it wants a creative pricing model.
4. Dedicated “Center of Excellence.”
A “center of excellence,” “shared service center,” “offshore development center” and “virtual outsourcing” all enable a global enterprise to develop, manage, update and retain knowledge processes. A “dedicated” “center of excellence” offers outsourcing benefits of managed services, minimal startup capital investment and a managed workforce, without ownership. It may just be an outsourcing with a call option (in the “build-own-operate-transfer” model).
Customer organizations might rely on this approach to build a center that would be transferred to a shared services captive over time. The big questions for both parties in such arrangements relate to return on investment by each, as well as key assumptions on supply, demand, opportunity cost and exit costs.
HR Management: Having Practical Control without Legal Control. Pricing models rarely address the costs of human capital investment and workforce management. The advent of these innovative pricing models invites a discussion beyond merely whether the “key employees” can be hired by the customer organization upon expiration or termination. Key topics for agreement include:
- Workforce Planning as a Team Sport. The customer having its own project management office anticipate the expiration of particular project phases where key employees might be transitioned away from the customer to another account of the service provider. By anticipating such transitions, and developing additional projects for such key employees to continue for the customer, both parties benefit through continuity, additional revenue and reduced training of replacement workers. Of course, this strains the provider’s own workforce management and the key employee’s career path. Unless the key employee is retained for increasingly challenging and complex work, he or she might leave the provider, to the detriment of both provider and customer.
- Planning for the Insourcing after the Outsourcing. In the 1990’s, outsourcing providers hired the customer’s production team, extracted and automated business processes, and then tranferrred work to lower cost venues. To the amazement of experienced employment lawyers at the time, enterprise customers were too naïve, generous or stupid to demand a headhunter’s price: one third of the person’s first year gross compensation. But when, now, enterprise customers want to re-hire persons who had been working on their business for years, service providers are reluctant to permit it, or seek to obtain a similar headhunter’s compensation. The topic of investment in human capital now merits a frank exchange on planning, scenarios, costs and benefits.
Conclusion. Sourcing relationship have become more modular. Every element of the relationship has an impact on pricing. Pricing structure, capital investment, ROI, end-game scenarios, tectonic shifts in the service delivery model and human capital management are now part of the process of getting to viable, enforceable agreements.
Outsourcing after Divestiture of Manufacturing Operations: IBM’s Services Agreement with Lenovo for Personal Computers
October 9, 2009 by Bierce & Kenerson, P.C.
In early December 2004, IBM’s announced sale of its personal computer division to Lenovo Group Ltd. (formerly known as Legend), a Chinese state-owned enterprise, heralds a new era in post-sale support. Sensitive issues of management control, marketing, trademark goodwill and customer support need to be addressed on cases of divestiture. The new model breaks ground in the degree of the “seller’s” ongoing involvement in the operations of the divested operation. Mergers and acquisitions advisors, chief executives and marketing officers can benefit from the lessons of the transaction.
Deal Structure.
Initial reports identified the deal as a sale with a value at between $1 billion and $2 billlion, for a division that analysts suggest generated $10 billion in annual revenues with roughly break-even profitability. The deal structure focused on enabling Lenovo to retain IBM customers and prospective customers, thereby maximizing the value of the transfer during a limited period. IBM will lend its trademark, marketing and customer support, technical assistance, financing and access to IBM’s sales channels outside of China.
Benefits to Lenovo.
The IBM support for marketing, sales, customer service, technical assistance and financing will provide several benefits to Lenovo:
- Reduced the infrastructure and services costs.
- Transfer of technology, know-how and management practices in every element of support so that Lenovo may reach the “IBM Standard” level of support consistent with the IBM brand and goodwill worldwide. Lenovo needs this transfer of skills to compete in a global market against Dell and Hewlett-Packard in the personal computer industry.
- A local “national champion” will be able to compete in the Chinese home market, which is now reported to be the second largest in the world after the United States.
Benefits to IBM.
IBM will reap financial benefits in fees and ongoing business:
- No Consolidation with IBM’s Financial Statements.
Consolidation of a subsidiary’s financial statements and income tax reporting could For IBM, the transaction had to be structured to avoid having its interest in Lenovo after the “sale” be consolidated and incorporated into IBM”s financial statements and tax returns as an affiliate (if Lenovo or the Lenovo entity were a domestic corporation) under Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. For both accounting and tax purposes, the threshold is 20%. IBM’s 18.9% ownership will easily pass this hurdle. The 1.1% difference provides a margin to argue against any potential claim by the IRS that intercompany transactions are not at arm’s length, therefore constitute some form of disguised equity under Section 482, and thereby consolidation should apply for income tax purposes. - Opportunities and Advantages.
Lenovo has shown substantial interest in adopting Western business practice, though it has a long way to go. - Employee Retention and Incentives.
Lenovo has adopted stock option plan for its employees. - Listing on Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
- Lenovo is listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. This listing. has made it a model, among Chinese companies, for corporate governance, privatization and shareholder rights.
- Steady and profitable revenue streams from technical support and financing, both of which IBM provides in the ordinary course to its own customers.
- Creation of a new customer (and, indeed, a lightning rod to attract other customers) that is owned partially by the Chinese government, thereby expanding IBM’s reach for its business consulting practice.
- IBM gets to reposition its management focus onto its core business of consulting services in business management, business process operations and information technology infrastructures and on selling and maintaining large computers that power large corporate networks and the Internet.
- This repositioning allows IBM to reduce its capital investment in marginally productive assets. While IBM’s financial statements do not segregate profitability of personal computers as part of its personal systems group that incldes computerized cash registers and point-of-sale computers used in retail sales.
Management Control.
Trademark Goodwill.
Ongoing Support after the “Sale.”
Comments. The sale of IBM’s disk drive manufacturing process to Hitachi set a standard for post-divestiture support.
Risks of the Deal.
By selling to Lenovo, IBM took a number of significant risks.
- Lack of Leadership.
The sale is an act of faith that Lenovo can learn to compete globally. At the time of sale, Lenovo was neither a technology leader (like IBM or Apple Computer Inc.) nor a cost-efficient producer (like Dell Inc.). Immediately before the sale, Lenovo was portrayed as a company in transition, losing market share to foreign competitors. - Restructuring and Retrenchment.
For a few years, Lenovo attempted to diversify into technology services and contract manufacturing. This diversification attempt apparently failed, resulting in layoffs and retrenchment. Lenovo’s ability to absorb the IBM personal computer manufacturing division and to develop the expertise in all aspects of product support and customer support presents a significant challenge. The challenge includes the possibliity that pursuing a global market strategy could weaken Lenovo’s focus on its home market, thereby putting the entire company at risk. - Geographical Concentration.
As of December 2004, Lenovo’s business was concentrated in China, with only 3% of sales coming from foreign sources. - Limited Global Supply Chain.
Lenovo’s dedication of its indigenous products to its indigenous market will result in serious logistical challenges. It will be highly dependent on IBM for process management and transitioning over time. If anything, the duration of IBM’s commitments to support product delivery, installation, repairs and after-sales customer support will probably continue for a long time. While Dell already outsources many of these functions, Dell has more experience in selecting and managing such service providers across many countries. Lenovo will have to learn not only to manage IBM (to avoid discontinuity), but also to develop and manage a global network of local logistics and support providers. Lenovo’s purchase will include many such personnel and facilities, but the process management will require a significant learning curve. Customers could be adversely affected. - Innovation by Competitors.
Lenovo’s growth in personal computers was based on cheap, easy to use basic computers. This might have been a strength from IBM’s viewpoint, since a strong Lenovo would not likely challenge IBM at the higher end of the computer manufacturing and infrastructure support business that IBM has defined as its sweet spot. Lenovo’s innovation is modest: using lower cost semiconductor chips from Advanced Micro Devices instead of from Intel. - High Cost Structure.
Lenovo faces keen cost pressure from Dell, which manufactures computers in China and Japan. - High Inventory Levels.
Lenovo has not yet mastered the “just-in-time” method of manufacturing. As a result, its “days of inventory” of unsold computers is substantially higher than for its competitors such as Dell and HP. According to a Wall Street Journal article, Dell has a 4-day rate, compared to Lenovo’s 27 days of inventory. Such inventory levels create risks of non-sale or of sale at depressed prices as competition drives prices down in a constant spiral. - Cultural Challenges for Chinese Enterprises in Joint Ventures with Western Enterprises.
The record of Chinese companies trying to acquire control of Western enterprises by a joint venture is short and challenged. - Historical Failures of Acquisitions in the Personal Computer Market.
Lenovo’s venture with IBM epitomizes an optimistic view about the feasibility of sustaining global market share in the personal computer market, as PC’s have become a low-priced commodity. NEC, Acer Group and Samsung Electronics Co. have all lost hundreds of millions in wasted investment in personal computers manufacturers such as Packard Bell Electronics Inc. (NEC), AST Research, Inc. (Samsung) and Texas Instruments Inc.’s PC unit (Acer). - High Mortality Rate in the PC Industry.
Since IBM defined the PC industry in 1981 with its signature personal computer, many market entrants have come and gone. Brand-name high volume computer manufacturing has become a capital-intensive business. For both Lenovo and, as a major shareholder in Lenovo, IBM, the risk of mortality is significant. However, IBM’s continuing involvement in marketing and tech support after the transfer will mitigate this risk for both parties. - Antitrust Review.
The size of the transaction requires notification to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission for antitrust review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR”).. In case of a complete divestiture to a new entrant that previously had a negligible market share in the U.S. consumer market, such review will be perfunctory. A similar review under the European Union competition laws is likely to be perfunctory. - Political Review of Foreign Investment in United States.
Depending on the deal structure, the transaction must be notified to U.S. authorities in charge of identifying and monitoring foreign investments in the United States. Such notifications raise questions of whether any economic sectors that are sensitive for national security or public policy will be adversely affected. Again, since the Lenovo-IBM transaction will not change the location where the PC’s are built and there are strong competitors such as Dell and Hewlett-Packard, this review should also be perfunctory. - Employment Rights.
Labor laws do not prevent mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or asset transfers that include operating facilities. In general, employment laws in many countries require that the selling employer give timely advance notice and meet with representatives of the workers designated by trade unions, works councils and/or by law. Such laws generally require a substantial advance notice. In the United States, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (the “WARN” Act) gives employees in units of over 100 employees a right to a 60-day warning of a plant closure or mass layoff. Failure to warn carries only the penalty of a duty to pay wages for 60 days from actual notice, whether or not the notice occurs before the transaction is completed. - Agreements with Third Parties.
A merger, acquisition or divestiture is a watershed event in business relationship of a company to its business relationships. - Intellectual Property.
In the field of intellectual property rights (“IPR”), third parties who have licensed their rights to the seller may have a contractual or statutory right to prohibit the buyer (here, Lenovo) from using such IPR. - Services.
Service agreements that support a line of business will need to be continued or amended. Transfer of the operations to a new enterprise may trigger a termination of such contracts. Ownership of less than 20% of the new business generally results in loss of sufficient control by the “selling” company such that third-party service providers may invoke any termination rights in their agreements. NOTE: Many outsourcing agreements might not include any such right of termination by the service provider for change of control of the enterprise customer (here, IBM, to the extent that it is a recipient of third-party services under such an outsourcing agreement). - Loans and Financing Arrangements.
Divestiture of assets may trigger an event of default under applicable bank loans, trust agreements for securitization of accounts receivable, shareholder agreements, credit and funding agreements, currency swap and hedging agreements and other financial arrangements. In this case, the particular segment being divested did not generate any material profits, and the $1.5 billion price tag might not even have been “material” for accounting or financial purposes. - Lease Agreements.
Landlords typically include a “change of control” provision that allows the landlord to terminate the lease upon a change of control. However, depending on lease negotiations, the tenants (such as IBM) typically require continuation of the lease if certain financial and operating conditions are met that give adequate assurance to the landlord of the financial strength of the new venture. - Conveyancing.
Under property law, the transfer of assets from one entity to another runs some typical negligible risks. If the assets are not well identified, a post-closing assignment may be required when they are discovered. For a business process-driven technology company, any lack of inventory records would appear a remote possibility, but prudent lawyers always require a “further assurance” clause to enable rectification of any omissions in the conveyancing of the seller’s owned assets at closing. - Post-Transfer Services and Support by the Seller.
Lenovo would not have been able to expand its markets to a global scope if IBM had not agreed to provide post-transfer services and support operations to Lenovo. In some divestitures and spin-offs, such post-closing support is merely a short-term lifeline at high cost and without meaningful assurances of quality, service levels, financial accountability or other protections for the service recipient (the spun-off or sold line of business). In this case, IBM’s 18.9% ownership interest in a restructured Lenovo gave the seller a long-term financial interest in assuring the best possible quality for transitional post-transfer services and support.
Post-script: As of July 2005, the deal has received all U.S. governmental approvals.
Outsourcing Law & Business Journal™: May 2009
May 27, 2009 by Bierce & Kenerson, P.C.
OUTSOURCING LAW & BUSINESS JOURNAL (™) : Strategies and rules for adding value and improving legal and regulation compliance through business process management techniques in strategic alliances, joint ventures, shared services and cost-effective, durable and flexible sourcing of services. www.outsourcing-law.com. Visit our blog at http://blog.outsourcing-law.com for commentary on current events.
Insights by Bierce & Kenerson, P.C., Editors. www.biercekenerson.com
Vol. 9, No. 5 (May, 2009)
___________________________
1. Contingency Planning for your Supply Chain: Business Continuity in a Pandemic.
2. Humor.
3. Conferences.
___________________________
1. Contingency Planning for your Supply Chain: Business Continuity in a Pandemic. The risk of a pandemic has become a realistic possibility, following the SARS outbreak in China a few years ago and the “swine flu” outbreak in Mexico in 2009. Business contingency planning should include not only the possibility of a pandemic but also the impact of a pandemic upon the supply chain including business operations performed by independent contractors (such as outsourcers and suppliers) and affiliates (captives and joint ventures). In a pandemic, 40% of the population (both workforce and customer universe) could be idled. Now is the time to develop contingency plans and obtain updated contingency plans from those in your extended supply chain.For the full article, click here.
2. Humor.
Cloud Computing, n. (1) multi-nodal virtualization of servers across a network; (2) numbers crunched in heaven; (3) IT services provided by supernatural forces.
Pandemic, n. (1) viral inspiration for Software as a Service, Cloud Computing, Work at Home Agents, telecommuting and virtualization of the global enterprise and its supply chain; (2) human resource roulette.
3. Conferences
June 3, 2009, Global Sourcing Council (GSC)’s Conference on Global Sourcing After the Meltdown: In Search of Sustainability, New York, New York. Sustainability has become more then politically correct slogan in global PR campaign. Sustainability-driven leaders harness the market potential for green products and services, especially in the times of global crisis.
The 2009 Sustainability in Global Sourcing Summit will examine how corporate sustainability creates stockholder value through the supply chain, especially in the area of global social responsibility. This event will serve as a forum for thought leaders from the business, academic and political arenas to:
- Challenge the pre-recession assumptions of global growth based on short-term results driven by the quarterly reporting system Propose a framework of aligning economic growth with sustainable social development
- Redefine the role of global sourcing after the global crisis
This conference can earn you 11 CLE (Continuing Legal Education) credits. For more information, click here.
June 7-9, 2009, IQPC’s 3rd Annual Shared Services Exchange, Miami, Florida. This is an invitation-only gathering for VP and C-Level senior executives made up of highly crafted, executive level conference sessions, interactive “Brain Weave” discussions, engaging networking opportunities and strategic one-on-one advisory meetings between solution providers and delegates. With a distinguished speaking faculty from Coca-Cola, CIGNA, American Electric Power, AOL and Safeway, amongst others, the seats at the 2009 Exchange are limited and filling up quickly. We have limited complimentary invitations available for qualified delegates for a limited time. Please give us your reference ‘Outsourcing-Law’ when inquiring. There are solution provider opportunities also available for companies who want to be represented. You can request your invitation at exchange@iqpc.com or call us at 1866-296-4580. Visit our website.
July 27-29, 2009, IQPC’s 7 th Annual Procure-to-Pay Summit, Boston, Massachussetts. Leveraging current opportunities around corporate spend management whilst minimizing the impact on A/P, the 7th Procure-to-Pay Summit is expanding on its previous success and featuring new additions to the program, including: in-depth coverage of various AP optimization approaches: centralization, outsourcing and automation; new emphasis on strategic sourcing and global procurement; new techniques and tools for maximizing supplier relationships in procurement and efficiently expediting supplier payments in AP. For more information, please click here.
September 22-23, 2009, American Conference Institute’s 7th Annual Advanced Forum on E-Discovery and Document Management, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Be a part of the leading cross-industry e-discovery and information management forum for corporate counsel, litigators, and technology professionals. At a time when most companies are striving to reduce costs and trim staff, the burdens of e-discovery can be crippling. What’s more, court-imposed sanctions for e-discovery failures could very well place you on the losing side of bet-the-company litigation. Given the complexity, variety, and evolving nature of information management and communication technologies, it comes as no surprise that corporate and outside counsel often find themselves at a loss as to how to manage the e-discovery process. However, neither opposing counsel nor the courts are going to have any sympathy for those who stumble over e-discovery hurdles. Thus, it is imperative that you take the lead in ensuring that your company is well-positioned to manage the demands of e-discovery. For more information, please click here.
September 28-October 2, 2009, IQPC and SSON 13th Annual Shared Services & Outsourcing Summit, Chicago, Illinois. Join us at the 13th Annual Shared Services & Outsourcing Summit this fall, the can’t-miss event for all professionals involved with shared services and outsourcing, at every stage of adoption. This customizable program provides the key strategies that you can bring back to your organization, with areas of focus in:
- Planning & Launching Shared Services Finance Transformation Measurement & Process Excellence HR Transformation
- Smart Contracting for Mature BPO Deals
Our Shared Services series attendees agree – the content from just one event vastly accelerates experiential learning and provides the necessary networking opportunities to benchmark against peers. Visit the website for more information, including webcasts, podcasts, articles and other resources.
******************************************
FEEDBACK: This newsletter addresses legal issues in sourcing of IT, HR, finance and accounting, procurement, logistics, manufacturing, customer relationship management including outsourcing, shared services, BOT and strategic acquisitions for sourcing. Send us your suggestions for article topics, or report a broken link at: webmaster@outsourcing-law.com The information provided herein does not necessarily constitute the opinion of Bierce & Kenerson, P.C. or any author or its clients. This newsletter is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Reproductions must include our copyright notice. For reprint permission, please contact: publisher@outsourcing-law.com . Edited by Bierce & Kenerson, P.C. Copyright (c) 2009, Outsourcing Law Global LLC. All rights reserved. Editor in Chief: William Bierce of Bierce & Kenerson, P.C. located at 420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2920, New York, NY 10170, 212-840-0080.